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ABSTRACT
CULTURAL INFLUENCES IN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY:
CONSERVATISM AND VERTICAL INDIVIDUALISM
by Cyrus Sarrafpour
After an extensive literature review on authoritarianism and right-wing ideology,
Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, and Sulloway (2003) developed a model of conservatism as
motivated social cognition. The model asserts that feelings of uncertainty, fear, and
threat stimulate existential, epistemic, and ideological social-cognitive motives, which in
turn lead to political conservatism in the forms of resistance to change and endorsement
of inequality. The model, however, generally bypassed the notion that situational factors,
such as cultural values, might also be influential in the manifestation and shaping of
conservative ideologies. This study included situational factors such as the role of a
hierarchical cultural dimension (Vertical Individualism) on conservative beliefs in the
forms of resistance to change and endorsement of inequality. A battery of surveys was
administered to assess the relationship between culture and conservatism. The surveys
were administered to an American university sample (N=157, 56 males and 101
females) as well as to general population samples from the USA (N=299, 140 males and
159 females) and Sweden (N=164, 73 males and 91 females) for cross-cultural
comparisons. Results indicated that Vertical Individualism (VI) is indeed associated with
conservatism and that this association holds cross-culturally. A multiple regression
analysis demonstrated that VI is an appropriate addition to Jost et al.’s (2003) model of
conservatism with respect to endorsement of inequality, but not for resistance to change.
Theoretical and applied results and implications are discussed.
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Introduction
Psychologists have been investigating the different psychological tendencies and
motives that underlie the political right and left for over half a century. Singling out and
studying conservatism as one type of sociopolitical ideology first began with a landmark
study of fascist-like personality and authoritarianism by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, and Sanford (1950). Since then, the study of right-wing ideology has
predominantly involved examining individual differences with respect to specific
ideological beliefs (e.g., resistance to change, dogmatism, and Right-Wing
Authoritarianism).
More recently, a relatively comprehensive model of conservatism, proposed by
Jost, Glaser, Krusglanski, and Sulloway (2003), went further than just focusing on
individual differences. The authors suggested that focusing solely on personality
differences is a mistake because people adopt “conservative ideologies in an effort to
satisfy various social-cognitive motives” (p. 339). Consequently, after reviewing the
voluminous literature and comparing differences between cognitive styles and
motivational needs across political ideologies, Jost et al. developed an integrative model
of political conservatism as motivated social cognition. In their model (Figure 1),
environmental stimuli such as feelings of fear, threat, and uncertainty contribute to social
cognitive motives, resulting in political conservatism in the forms of resistance to change
and endorsement of inequality. The social-cognitive motives in the model involve three
domains. The first includes epistemic motives, including dogmatism, intolerance of
ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, need for order, structure, and closure, whereby beliefs
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and information are reached through a process of motivated search for knowledge to
make sense of the world. The second domain comprises of existential motives, such as
self-esteem, loss prevention, and terror management, in which people develop to cope
with existing crises that are inherent in the human experience. Third are ideological
motives, including rationalization of self-interest, group-based dominance, and system
justification, where sociopolitical theories are used to focus on the societal system as a
whole as well as the psychological and ideological functions that a conservative
orientation might fulfill.

Environmental
Stimuli

Uncertainty

Ideological Motives
Social-Cognitive
Motives

Fear/Threat

Existential
Motives

Rationalization of
self-interest

Epistemic Motives

Loss-prevention

Dogmatism,
Intolerance of
ambiguity

Terror
Management

Uncertainty
avoidance

Self-esteem

Group-based
dominance
System Justification

Need for order,
structure, closure

Political Conservatism
Conservatism

Endorsement of Inequality

Figure 1. Social-Cognitive Motives of Conservatism.
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Resistance to Change

Although the model proposed by Jost et al. (2003) is sophisticated and relatively
comprehensive, their model neglected cultural aspects of political ideology, and the
influence of cultural values and societal norms was not given as much weight as potential
ideological social-cognitive motives (e.g., cultural acceptance of group-based
dominance.) Cultural values with respect to political ideology can be investigated by
examining aspects of social structures favored by a collective, such as the endorsement or
opposition of a social hierarchy in terms of wealth, social class, status or power. These
types of attributes of societal hierarchy, and consequent power differentiations, can be
perceived as being more or less acceptable based on corresponding cultural values. The
realization of the general approval or disapproval of such hierarchical powerdifferentiations can lead to the development of a deeper and better understanding of rightwing political movements, such as approval for fascist-like legislature, public support for
the restriction of individual freedom by authorities, or public support of withholding
government assistance to those in need (e.g., universal healthcare, welfare programs,
economic safety-nets), as will be discussed in upcoming chapters.
The present study investigated the relationship between cultural values of how a
society should be structured (e.g., social hierarchy or social equality), and political
ideology. I assessed the relationship between ideological conservative components and
acceptance of social hierarchies, and propose the inclusion of Vertical Individualism, a
type of cultural value, into Jost et al.’s (2003) model of conservatism as part of
ideological social-cognitive motives.
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Cultural Dimensions
The most studied cultural dimensions in psychology are collectivism and
individualism (Brewer & Chen, 2007). These cultural dimensions pertain to a person’s
subjective perception of his or her relationship with the entire collective, as well as with
the other individuals in that respective collective (Brewer & Chen). In cultures that tend
to be more collectivistic, individuals have a self-perception of being co-dependent with
others in their environment, and socio-cultural beliefs and collective interests are of high
personal value as they are considered to be more important than the individual’s interest.
In contrast, people in cultures that are more individualistic tend to view themselves as
being autonomous from others, hence they have a higher regard for individual
achievement and personal freedom with rights separate from, and at times above, the one
of the collective.
However, due to the constructs of individualism and collectivism being widely
criticized for their ambiguous definitions and lack of conceptual clarity (Tsui et al., 2007),
researchers have dissected these constructs further into vertical and horizontal dimensions
(Triandis, 1995). The vertical dimension of a culture reflects beliefs that view the self
differently from other selves in a collective, and thus involve an accepting attitude of a
social hierarchy or order based on social status and class. In contrast, a horizontal
dimension corresponds to a belief and value system of equality between individuals in a
collective, where individuals in a society are and should be of equal value. The
horizontal dimension has less of an acceptance and support for a society comprised of
social class and hierarchy. Taken together, four distinct dimensions of culture can be
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identified: Horizontal Individualism (HI), Vertical Individualism (VI), Horizontal
Collectivism (HC), and Vertical Collectivism (VC).
Triandis and Gelfand (1998) summarized and discussed the theoretical and
empirical support for the components of each of these dimensions. They stated that
people high on the HI dimension want to be distinct and unique from other groups and
fellow group members. HI people are very self-reliant, trend towards doing things their
own way, and are likely to say “I want to do my own thing,” but do not have a particular
interest in attaining high-status or becoming distinguished by the group. In contrast,
people high on the VI dimension tend to strive for social status and to be able to
distinguish themselves from the rest of the collective by competing with other individuals
in the same group. People high on the HC dimension emphasize mutual objectives with
others, sociability, and interdependence, but they are reluctant to submit to authority.
They also see themselves as being similar to others in their respective collective. For
people high on VC, the central theme of self-concept revolves around the importance of
the collective; individuals in this dimension highly value the integrity of their respective
society. For instance, they are willing to sacrifice individual personal goals for the
objective of their society while supporting competition of their respective collective with
external ones. Individuals in this dimension tend to comply and submit to demands from
authority even if what is asked of them is considered “extremely distasteful” (Triandis &
Gelfand, p. 119).
In theory, cultural dimensions are a suitable addition to the social-cognitive
motives that are composed of a cluster of situational and social values. Epistemic and
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existential motivational theories focus on the individual, and perceive the manifestation
of conservative behavior and attitudes as a result of these cognitive-motivations. In
contrast, ideological motives focus on sociopolitical systems and how these result in
ideological functions that conservatism might satisfy. Hence, cultural values are suitable
in the ideological sphere of conservatism because they are comprised of socially learned
values that influence sociopolitical ideologies.
Conservatism – Definition, Socioeconomic Inequality and Resistance to Change
In defining conservatism, Neilson proposed that conservatism is “the disposition
and tendency to preserve what is established; opposition to change” (Neilson, 1958, p.
568, cited in Jost et al. 2003). In a similar vein, Morris claimed that conservatism is the
“disposition in politics to maintain the existing order” (Morris, 1976, p. 312). Others
have defined conservatism as “an attitude of opposition to disruptive change in the social,
economic, legal, religious, political, or cultural order” (Rossiter, 1968, p. 291, cited in
Jost et al. 2003). Consistent with these definitions, research on conservative ideology has
found that the key component for self-definition of conservatives and liberals concern the
resistance to, rather than acceptance of, change (Conover & Feldman, 1981).
Jost et al. (2003) reviewed a set of changing peripheral, or secondary,
associations of conservatism. They summarized that conservatism, as a historical
ideological belief system, has expressed many things, including “the desire for order and
stability, preference for gradual rather than revolutionary change (if any), adherence to
preexisting social norms, idealization of authority figures, punishment of deviants, and
endorsement of social and economic inequality” (Jost et al., pg. 343). For instance, after
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studying the left and right wings of traditional political spectrums, Giddens (1998) stated
that a major condition that consistently reappears when trying to distinguish the right
from the left concerns attitudes and beliefs towards equality. Left-wing societies tend
towards equality, whereas right-wing societies tend toward hierarchy (p. 40).
Research linking resistance to change and endorsement of inequality aligns with
the tenets of a vertical individualistic cultural dimension. In the next chapter I discuss
how a vertical cultural orientation favors a hierarchical societal structure, consequently
endorsing the status-quo socioeconomic inequality while also expressing reluctance
towards changing it into a more egalitarian one. Therefore, a high vertical cultural
orientation expresses reluctance to changing an already unequal socioeconomic societal
structure.
Conservatism and Vertical Individualism
In order to understand how culture and ideology affect each other, we can
examine their related and co-varying components. For instance, a study conducted by
Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) showed that individuals who score high on
conservatism, compared to those who score low, tend to be against affirmative action in
America. In response to such findings, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) examined beliefs
concerning the distaste and negative attitudes towards government-run social
interventions, such as affirmative action, with respect to one’s self-concept and worldview. They found that those who expressed negative attitudes and disapproval of
government programs aimed at assisting the public (e.g., Affirmative action) tend to
score higher on measures of individualism. Moreover, those scoring high on
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individualism were shown to endorse principles of micro-justice, which affirmative
action is violating by assisting a minority (out-group), and oppose principles of macrojustice, which affirmative action is promoting. Findings such as these theoretically align
with the vertical-individualistic cultural dimensions in that individuals have to compete
with each other; giving a certain group any type of advantage that is not given to the rest
of the collective as a way for them to rise in the social hierarchy is “cheating” and
unfavorable.
The effects of this pro-hierarchical world-view can further be detected amongst
studies in political psychology. For instance, Castelli and Carraro (2010) examined the
role of cognitive processes with respect to attitude formation amongst a variety of
political ideologies. They showed that compared to liberals, conservatives tend to
characterize physiological attributes to negative stimuli amongst people, such as skin
color or ethnicity, and also consider themselves to be higher up on a “moral hierarchy.”
Along the same lines, a study by Shook and Fazio (2009) demonstrated that conservatives
tend to display significantly more avoidant strategies than liberals while exploring the
environment, which lead them to stronger learning asymmetries and favoring the learning
of negative over positive stimuli. What these types of research have in common is that
they both not only indicate that negative information automatically grabs the attention of
more conservative individuals, but also that they form more negative attitudes toward
social minorities while stereotyping based on negative arbitrary information. This further
indicates a tendency of highly conservative individuals to categorize or “classify” people
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into lower stages of social hierarchy, especially marginalized groups such as immigrants,
homosexuals, minorities, or other non-traditional social groups.
Further indications suggesting that conservatism is associated with a verticalindividualistic cultural dimension can be seen with respect to beliefs about ideal
government spending. For instance Skitka and Tetlock (1993) conducted a study on
conservative political ideology with respect to public assistance in forms of government
funding, and showed that highly conservative individuals tend to blame poverty on selfindulgence, lack of moral standards, and intelligence. Those scoring low on conservatism
perceive the poor as being victims of unjust social practices and structures. Skitka &
Tetlock’s study also showed that low scoring conservatives tend to have attitudes that
favor applicants of public assistance programs. However, those scoring high on
conservatism are more motivated to withhold assistance from those who are believed to
have created their own need for assistance, and more concerned about preventing “freeriders” from taking advantage of the system.
In general, individuals with less conservative ideologies (e.g., left-wing liberals)
favor increased spending on social programs that assist the poor or those in need, whereas
conservatives tend to favor the opposite (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). This aligns with the
vertical cultural orientation in that high-scoring conservatives are in favor of an unequal
socioeconomic status-quo and more reluctant to changing it, hence being more or less
supportive of a societal hierarchy. Low-scoring conservatives, however, have more
egalitarian attitudes towards wealth distribution.
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Cross-cultural research in political psychology has also shown that horizontal and
vertical dimensions of culture co-vary with respect to milieu, culture, and culture-induced
beliefs about “ideal societies.” For instance, Fiske (1992) and Rokeach (1973) examined
characteristics pertaining to VI, CI, HC, and HC across nations and cultures, and found
patterns of cultural and political attributes pertaining to the concept of the self and worldview associated with the corresponding dominant cultural dimension. A sample of their
findings can be seen in Table 1 (adapted from Triandis, 1996).

Table 1.
Relation of Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism to Other
Typologies
Dimension
Vertical Self
Fiske (1992)

Rokeach (1973)

Horizontal Self
Fiske (1992)

Rokeach (1973)

Collectivism

Individualism

Self different from others
Communal sharing
Authority ranking
Low freedom
Low equality
Communism (e.g., China)

Self different from others
Market pricing
Authority ranking
High freedom
Low equality
Market democracy (e.g.,
France)

Self same as other
Communal sharing
Equality matching
Low freedom
High equality
Communal living (e.g., kibbutz)

Self same as others
Market pricing
Equality matching
High freedom
High equality
Democratic socialism (e.g.,
Sweden)
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Objective
Taking ecological and individual difference factors influencing political
ideologies into consideration, I hypothesized that an influential feature missing from the
Jost et al.’s (2003) model of conservatism is the acceptance or dismissal of a hierarchical
(vertical) based social structure. Specifically, I expected that a vertical individualistic
cultural dimension would be a suitable addition to the ideological motives portion of Jost
et al.’s model. Discussing the model, Matthews et al. (2009) summarized the ideological
motives as emphasizing “the extent to which maintenance of a certain social system is
important for the individual’s sense of security, and [that] they are primarily indexed by
the constructs of social dominance orientation and system justification” (p. 922). Along
the same lines, I am attempting to demonstrate that cultural dimensions in conjunction
with Social Dominance Orientation and system justification can substantially account for
the variance in conservatism, as assessed by resistance to change and endorsement of
inequality.
Furthermore, in order to enforce the construct validity of Vertical Individualism
and investigate if it indeed is culturally-dependent, samples from Sweden and the United
States were compared. An economically class-based society should in theory score
higher on Vertical Individualism (U.S) than a more egalitarian one where income
inequality is substantially less (Sweden). Higher scores on endorsement of inequality and
reluctance for changing the unequal status-quo societal system were also predicted. I
tested these hypotheses by comparing how a more egalitarian oriented, social-democratic,
society (Sweden) scored on Vertical Individualism and components of conservatism
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compared to a more socioeconomically hierarchical one (USA) and how they differ on
Social Dominance Orientation, System Justification, and reluctance to social change.
Social Dominance Orientation
Social dominance theory takes societal and evolutionary factors into consideration
as elements of hierarchy promoting social orientations. This theory suggests that
societies attempt to reduce group conflict by developing ideological belief systems that
validate the domination of some social groups over others (Pratto et al., 1994). This is
done through the proclamation of several “legitimizing myths.” The first is “paternalistic
myths,” which proclaim that certain groups need to be above others in order to take care
and lead other subordinate groups who might be unable to take care of themselves. The
second is “reciprocal myths,” which claim that a relationship between the dominant and
subordinate groups exists and works in symbiosis with each other, and that these two
groups complement each other in a society. Third are the “sacred myths,” which assert
that the dominant position of certain groups that are high up in the hierarchy, as well as
subordinate groups that are low in it, is due to the will of God or some other divine power
(Sidanius, 1993, pp. 207 – 209). These ideological devices are intrinsically conservative,
as they assert an ideology that restricts qualitative social change while striving to
preserve pre-existing hierarchies of wealth, status, and power (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Social dominance theory emphasizes that beliefs and attitudes concerning social
dominance are mutually determined by socialization and biology, and that significant
individual differences among people exist with respect to Social Dominance Orientation
(Pratto et al.). Furthermore, SDO is not only associated with seeking to sustain
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hierarchical order, but it has also been shown that individuals high in the construct wish
to increase the degree of group dominance and social hierarchy, as it is an appealing
ideological goal when one belongs to a high-status group (Altemeyer, 1998; Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999).
The instrument used to assess SDO is composed of two subscales encompassing
the opposition and reluctance to egalitarianism, social equality and desire for group-based
dominance (Jost & Thompson, 2000). In reviewing the literature on SDO and
conventional measures of economic and political conservatism, Jost et al. (2003) found
that the average correlation between them is about .30. SDO has also been shown to
correlate reliably with nationalism, anti-Black racism, sexism, Right-Wing
Authoritarianism, the belief in a just and fair world, and identification with the
Republican Party in the United States (Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto et al., 1994). The
aforementioned findings suggest that SDO is a valuable and practical measure to assess
hierarchical based socio-cultural beliefs, and should in theory be associated with verticalindividualism.
System Justification
Many personality theories pertaining to right-wing ideology assert ego-justifying
or ego-defensive aspects of conservatism, especially theories of dogmatism, anxiety
reduction, and authoritarianism. That is, the need and satisfaction individuals derive
from forecasting situations, security, and obedience can explain their attraction to rightwing ideological attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981). Even though motives
of ego-justification constitute an important part of the fostering of right-wing ideology,
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group-justifying and system-justifying motives are also satisfied in a proficient manner
by conservative ideologies (Jost & Banaji, 1994). For instance, social dominance theory,
discussed above, asserts that the manifestations of conservative legitimizing myths are
attempts of group-justification in order to vindicate the interest and objectives of
individuals in high-status and dominant groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
System justification theory concerns the tendency of individual’s motivation to
perpetuate inequality and preserve the status quo, while focusing on his or her cognitive
thought patterns leading to the subscription of such ideological beliefs (Jost & Banaji,
1994). A key objective of system justification theory is to understand why and in what
manner individuals rationalize the present social system, particularly when their
endorsement of it appears to be in their own disadvantage, and in conflict with motives to
enhance self-esteem or enhance group standing (Jost & Banaji, 1994).
The theory is derived from numerous existing theories, such as Marxist, feminist,
and sociological theories of legitimizing the status quo to justify the acceptance of right
wing ideologies and practices (Jost, 1995). Perhaps the most influential theories
responsible for the drafting of system justification are cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957, cited in Jost et al. 2003) and just world theory (Lerner, 1980, cited in
Jost et al. 2003), which assert that individuals are motivated to understand existing social
systems as rational, legitimate, justifiable, inevitable, and a part of the “natural order.”
Jost et al. (2003) argue that political conservatism is present across social classes
because nearly everyone is motivated to justify and explain the status quo to the extent
that it is perceived as just and fair. Furthermore, system justification is a good mediator
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of political conservatism and should be the strongest amongst individuals on the lower
stages of the hierarchy (e.g., women and members of the working class) as they are
particularly vulnerable to the system, and hence have the most to rationalize, explain, and
justify. Additionally, to minimize dissonance, one would enforce allegiance to the
system itself, which is a motivational key enforcement of system justification. Aside
from being part of Jost et al.’s (2003) ideological model of social-cognitive motives,
system justification is based on the ideology of social structures and therefore well suited
to act as mediator between hierarchical and non-hierarchical societies and conservative
psychological components.
Hypotheses
The prediction of the current study is that the cultural dimension of Vertical
Individualism is positively correlated with the conservative ideological components, such
as group-based dominance and system justification, and political conservatism, in forms
of endorsement of inequality and resistance to change. Therefore my first hypothesis is
that Vertical Individualism positively correlates with Social Dominance Orientation
(group-based dominance), General System Justification, Economic System Justification
(endorsement of inequality), and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (resistance to change).
I then progress to demonstrate that Vertical Individualism is not only capable of
forecasting conservative values, but is also a suitable addition to Jost et al.’s (2003)
model of ideological motives of conservatism. This leads to the second hypothesis that
Vertical Individualism will predict conservatism, in the forms of endorsement of
inequality and resistance to change, together with the contributions of Social Dominance
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Orientation and General System Justification. Study 1 tests these first two hypotheses
using American college-aged students.
Finally, the relationship between culture and ideology was tested cross-culturally
in order to reinforce its construct validity as well as to illustrate that this association is
indeed culture-dependent. Sweden is considered a more egalitarian oriented society (e.g.,
emphasis on the welfare of the community and social democracy) than the U.S., which is
in theory more hierarchical (e.g., emphasis on individual freedom and free market
capitalism). Consequently, my third hypothesis is that scores of conservatism and
Vertical Individualism should be significantly lower for Swedish participants due to
Sweden’s egalitarian oriented societal structure, as compared to participant from the
United States. Further, the fourth hypothesis was that Vertical Individualism, together
with conservatism, should be a less important predictor of conservatism for the Swedish
sample than for the American one. Study 2 tests these hypotheses by comparing
representative samples of Swedish and American adults on the key variables in this study,
including Vertical Individualism (VI), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), General(GSJ) and Economic System Justification (ESJ), and measure of resistance to change in
forms of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA).
Scale Characteristics
All scales displayed high levels of reliability across samples aside from the RWA
scale for the Swedish sample (Table 2). The Swedish RWA scale was also the only
instrument not translated, as it already was available in Swedish. I was unable to find
satisfactory reliability even after multiple forms of factor and psychometrical analysis.
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Table 2.
Scale Characteristics – University (N=157), USA (N=299), Sweden (N=164)
Sample

Scale

SD

Cronbach’s α

N items

M

General System Justification

8

3.66

.87

.71

Economic System Justification

17

4.65

.87

.76

Social Dominance Orientation

16

2.77

.90

.90

Vertical Individualism

4

4.31

1.23

.82

Authoritarianism

12

5.08

.96

.76

Conservatism

12

4.44

1.15

.86

Traditionalism

12

4.02

1.26

.84

General System Justification

8

4.08

1.01

.76

Economic System Justification

17

4.67

1.05

.79

Social Dominance Orientation

16

2.84

1.04

.88

Vertical Individualism

4

4.02

1.09

.67

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

15

3.85

1.00

.82

General System Justification

8

3.69

1.00

.80

Economic System Justification

17

4.11

1.55

.83

Social Dominance Orientation

16

2.44

1.07

.92

Vertical Individualism

4

3.44

1.13

.70

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

15

4.10

1.07

.27

University (N =157)

USA (N = 299)

Sweden (N = 164)

Study 1
Participants
For the first study, 157 participants (56 male and 101 female, MAge = 23.4) were
recruited through an introductory university psychology course and received course credit
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for their participation. Ethnicity and education levels for the sample can be seen in
Appendix A.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were asked to complete four different scales in the form of surveys
and a brief demographic questionnaire. The four scales encompass attitudes and beliefs
pertaining to the acceptance of societal inequality, resistance to societal change, system
justification, and a measure assessing cultural dimensions (horizontal and verticalindividualism and collectivism). All surveys were administered online.
Group based dominance. The Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO), a
widely used scale developed by Pratto et al. (1994), aims at measuring the preference for
inequality among social groups. It has been shown that individuals who score high on
SDO are more likely to pursue and support hierarchy-enhancing professional roles,
whereas those that score low on the SDO scale seek hierarchy reducing professional roles.
Moreover, the measure has been linked to political and social ideologies that are in favor
of societal hierarchy. The SDO scale consists of 16 items, measured on a 1 to 7-point
Likert scale (1 = extremely negative and 7 = extremely positive), asking respondents how
they feel about certain questions, such as “we should strive to make incomes as equal as
possible” or “group equality should be our ideal.”
System Justification. A System Justification scale, developed by Zimmerman et
al. (2013), was used to assess attitudes and beliefs about the righteousness of one’s
current societal structure. The scale consists of 8 items measured on a 7-point Likert type
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scale, and includes items such as “In general, you find society is fair” and “Everyone
does have a fair shot at wealth and happiness.”
Resistance to Change. Much research, particularly in political psychology, has
used Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) to measure right wing and conservative
ideologies. RWA encompasses the covariation of traits, including authoritarian
aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981). However,
the RWA scale measures these traits as a combination of social values and attitudes in a
unidimensional fashion. In order to create a scale that measures these traits separately of
each other while maintaining strong statistical reliability, Duckitt et al. (2010) developed
the Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Scale (ACT), which re-conceptualizes
Altemeyer’s RWA Scale into factorial distinct dimensions. The ACT Scale consists of
36 items across three scales based on Altemeyer’s RWA Scale, but rephrased as
Authoritarianism (instead of authoritarian aggression), Conservatism (for authoritarian
submission), and Traditionalism (conventionalism). The items are scored on a Likert
type scale ranging from –4 to +4, and reflects one’s agreement or disagreement with
statements such as: “Strong, tough government will harm not help our country”
(authoritarianism), “It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy
authority” (conservatism), and “The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values”
still show the best way to live” (traditionalism).
Both the RWA and the ACT scale were used, but in different studies; the ACT
scale was used for the university sample, whereas the participants from the Qualtrics
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panel (the US and the Swedish samples) were administered a shorter, 15-item version, of
the RWA scale (Zakrisson, 2005).
Cultural Dimensions. Cultural assessment was made using Triandis and
Gelfand’s (1998) Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism Scale. The
scale consists of four items for each dimension, resulting in a total of 16 items, measured
on a 7-point Likert type scale. Items include “I’d rather depend on myself than others”
(horizontal individualism), “it is important that I do my job better than others” (verticalindividualism), “if a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud” (horizontal collectivism),
and “parents and children must stay together as much as possible (vertical collectivism).
Acceptance of Inequality. To measure ideological based tendencies of the
endorsement and legitimization of economic inequality, the Economic System
Justification scale was used (Jost & Thompson, 2000). The scale consists of 17 items
measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 9, comprised of items such as “poor people are not
essentially different than rich people” (reversely scored) or “economic positions are
legitimate reflections of people’s achievements.”
Results
I hypothesized that ideological conservative factors, stressing acceptance of
inequality and resistance to societal change, are systematically related to a cultural
dimension embracing hierarchical tenets. I used a University sample (N = 157) to test
this prediction by exploring how components of conservatism, measured by General (M =
3.66, SD = .87) and Economic (M = 4.65, SD = .87) System Justification and Social
Dominance Orientation (M = 2.77, SD = .90) relate to a hierarchy oriented individualistic
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cultural dimension, measured by a Vertical Individualism scale (M = 4.31, SD = 1.23).
Among the University sample, Vertical Individualism was significantly
correlated with General System Justification (r = .286, p < .001), Economic System
Justification (r = .333, p < .001), and Social Dominance Orientation (r = .344, p < .001),
but not with the Authoritarianism-Traditionalism-Conservatism scales (all p values are
two-tailed.) Hence the cultural dimension was positively correlated with the ideological
components of conservatism as well as political conservatism in forms of endorsement of
inequality, but not with resistance to change. Table 3 depicts correlations between
variables.
Table 3.
Correlations Between Vertical Individualism and Conservative Components
University Sample (N = 157)
Measure
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

-

VI
GSJ
.286**
SDO
.344**
.191*
ESJ
.333**
.410*
.527**
Auth
.125
.343**
.194*
.412**
Trad
.040
.240**
.297**
.250**
.165*
Cons
.082
.323**
.259**
.415**
.397**
.554**
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed)
Note. VI = Vertical Individualism, GSJ = General System Justification, ESJ =
Economic System Justification, SDO: Social Dominance Orientation, Auth =
Authoritarianism, Trad =Traditionalism, Cons = Conservatism

Multiple Regression Analyses. I also predicted that Vertical Individualism
would predict endorsement of inequality (Economic System Justification) and resistance
to change (Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism) alongside the ideological
variables of General System Justification and Social Dominance Orientation. Results
21

indicated that Vertical Individualism was not able to predict Economic System
Justification (Table 4), Authoritarianism (Table 5), Conservatism (Table 6), or
Traditionalism (Table 7) alongside the ideological conservative variables of General
System Justification and Social Dominance Orientation.

Table 4.
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Endorsement of
Inequality - University Sample (N = 157)
Variable
Economic System Justification
b
Constant
2.10
Vertical Individualism
.07
General System Justification
.30
Social Dominance Orientation
.42
2
R
.39
F
31.95***
***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed)

SE b

β

.29
.05
.07
.07

.10
.30***
.44***

Table 5.
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Resistance to Change
Authoritarianism (N = 157)
Variable
Authoritarianism
b
Constant
3.41
Vertical Individualism
- .01
General System Justification
.36
Social Dominance Orientation
.15
2
R
.16
F
7.908***
***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed)
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SE b
.38
.06
.09
.09

β
- .12
.32***
.14

Table 6.
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Resistance to Change
Conservatism (N = 157)
Variable
Conservatism
b

SE b

Constant
2.48
.45
Vertical Individualism
- .08
.08
General System Justification
.40
.10
Social Dominance Orientation
.29
.10
2
R
.15
F
8.973***
** p < .01, ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed)

β
- .08
.30***
.23**

Table 7.
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Resistance to Change
Traditionalism (N = 157)
Variable
Traditionalism
b

SE b

Constant
2.25
.50
Vertical Individualism
- .13
.08
General System Justification
.32
.16
Social Dominance Orientation
.42
.11
2
R
.14
F
8.037***
** p < .01, ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed)

β
- .13
.22**
.30***

Discussion of Results
The premise of this study revolves around whether or not a cultural dimension
embracing hierarchical tenets is present, can be measured, and is associated with
conservative values. I tested this by assessing how Vertical Individualism (VI), a cultural
dimension emphasizing status and hierarchical social values, relate to constructs that has
been shown to predict conservatism, such as Social Dominance Orientation, General and
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Economic System Justification. Within the University sample, there was a significant
positive correlation between VI and endorsement of inequality; however, no significant
correlation was found between VI and resistance to change.
Building on the assertion that a VI cultural dimension is associated to
conservatism, I hypothesized that it also has the potential of predicting the construct in
terms of endorsement of inequality and resistance to social change together with the
ideological variables. Using a multiple regression analyses, I was not able to support this
prediction as VI did not contribute significantly to the variance of conservatism in terms
of endorsement of inequality or resistance to change.
The notion that VI does not correlate with or predict resistance to change and
endorsement of inequality may be possibly attributed to the relatively young age of the
sample (MAge = 23.4). People tend to become more strongly rooted in their political and
cultural values with higher age, as well as more fiscally and socially conservative
Altemeyer, 1996; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). For instance, the mean age for those
identifying with right-wing political groups (e.g., the Republican- and Tea party) tend to
be higher than for the relatively more left-leaning ones (e.g., the Democratic and Green
party.) Younger people tend to be less religious and oppose military interventions while
favoring pro-LGBT legislation and novel social government programs (Hetherington &
Weiler). Further, when reviewing the literature on the demographics of high-scoring
RWA’s, Altemeyer (1996) found that they tend to be older than those scoring low, and
proposed that this could be due to longitudinal change or cross-sectional differences.
Along the same lines, the beliefs and values of this young cohort might still be evolving
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and may have not yet reached a definite level that will be longitudinally internalized.
Furthermore, the ACT-Scale might also have been problematic as it has not been a
frequently used instrument when assessing resistance to change, whereas the Right-Wing
Authoritarianism (RWA) scale has (Jost et al., 2003; Altemeyer, 1996). Study 2
addressed these issues by using two general population samples from two distinct
cultures while also replacing the ACT-Scale with a shortened RWA scale.
Study 2
In the second study, I investigated whether a difference could be found between
industrialized cultures that have, at face value, historical and political systems
emphasizing egalitarianism (e.g., social democracy) and those that traditionally value
hierarchical free-market tendencies. In short, I predicted that a hierarchical cultural
difference could be found in VI between a generally political liberal country (Sweden,
less hierarchy) and a more conservative one (USA, more hierarchy).
Participants
Participant recruitment for the second study went through Qualtrics Services, a
research oriented organization that recruits participants for survey based studies and
grants them with points that can be redeemed for an undisclosed monetary compensation
or other types of internal rewards. Participants were recruited from Sweden (N = 164, 73
men and 91 women, Mage = 52.39) and from the United States (N = 299, 140 men and 159
women, Mage = 59). The only recruitment criteria was that participants had to be older
than 21 years of age. Ethnicity and educational characteristics can be seen in Appendix
A.
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Materials and Procedure
The same methodology and instruments from Study 1 were implemented in Study
2, with the exception of the ACT scale which was replaced with the short-RWA scale.
The short-RWA scale is a 15-item instrument measuring the authoritarian spectrum and is
used to assess resistance to social and societal change (Zakrisson, 2005).
Translation
All of the instruments (GSJ, SDO, and ESJ) were translated for the Swedish
sample, except for the short-RWA scale, which was already available in Swedish
(Zakrisson, 2005). The translation was first made by Qualtrics Translation Services, and
then back translated by two native Swedish-speaking individuals. Few adjustments were
made in the wording of the items after the instruments were translated back into English.
A pilot study with three native Swedish-speaking participants with fluency in English,
being asked to compare the Swedish to English instruments, was conducted in order to
evaluate whether the items corresponded to the English versions. Aside from few minor
wording adjustments, the instruments reached a satisfactory level of translation.
Results
Similar to what was found in Study 1, the samples in Study 2 showed significant
positive correlations between VI and ideological and outcome variables of conservatism
for both Sweden (N = 164, GSJ r = .197, p < .01; ESJ r = .360, p < .001; SDO r = .238, p
< .001) and the United States (N = 299, GSJ r = .231, p < .001; ESJ r = .367, p < .001;
SDO r = .234, p < .001; RWA r = .188, p < .001). However, the correlation to resistance
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to change was not significant for the Swedish sample.

Table 8.
Correlations Between Cultural and Conservative Components – Sweden (N=164)
Measure
1
2
3
4
5

6

1
2
3
4
5
6

-

VI
GSJ
SDO
ESJ
RWA-Resistance
RWA
* p < .05, **p < .01,

.197*
.238**
.026
.360**
.106
.320
.027
.731**
.029
.041
.266**
.643**
.156*
.322**
***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed)

.722**

Note. VI = Vertical Individualism, GSJ = General System Justification, ESJ = Economic
System Justification, SDO: Social Dominance Orientation, RWA-Resistance = Right-Wing
Authoritarianism-Resistance, RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism

The Swedish RWA measure displayed problematic issues as it lacked a
satisfactory level of internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .27). Due to the RWA scale
being flawed and unsatisfactory, I conducted a factor analysis that only used two items
that would give adequate internal reliability (alpha = .70), resulting in a more accurate
construct reflecting resistance to social change. The items included were “our country
needs free thinkers who will have the courage to stand up against traditional ways, even if
this upsets many people” and “our society would be better off if we showed tolerance and
understanding for untraditional values and opinions.” Correlations between VI and
conservative components for the Swedish and American sample can be seen in Table 8
and Table 9 respectively.
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Table 9.
Correlations Between Cultural and Conservative Components – USA (N = 299)
Measure
1
2
3
4
5

1

2

3

Vertical Individualism
General System Justification
.231**
Social Dominance Orientation
.234**
.152**
Economic System Justification
.367**
.379**
.679**
RWA
.188**
.273**
.315**
* p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed)

4

5

.411**

-

The third hypothesis proposed that the Swedish sample would score lower on VI
and conservative components due to its more egalitarian-oriented milieu. The prediction
was supported by an independent sample t-test as noteworthy significant differences were
found between the two countries (Table 10), with the United States scoring higher on
both conservative components (GSJ, SDO, and ESJ) and for the hierarchical cultural
dimension (VI, t’s (456 – 460) > 3.90, p’s < .001).

Table 10.
Independent Sample t-test for USA and Sweden
USA (N = 299)

Sweden (N = 164)

Scale

M

SD

M

SD

t

df

p

D

VI
GSJ
SDO
ESJ

4.02
4.08
2.84
4.67

1.09
1.01
1.04
1.05

3.44
3.69
2.44
4.11

1.00
1.17
1.07
1.55

5.40
4.04
3.91
4.59

460
460
456
456

< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001

.53
.39
.38
.38

Note. VI = Vertical Individualism, GSJ = General System Justification, ESJ = Economic
System Justification, SDO: Social Dominance Orientation, RWA-Resistance = Right-Wing
Authoritarianism-Resistance. All p values are two-tailed.
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Multiple Regression Analyses. Multiple regression analysis was used to test if
VI could be of potential inclusion in the ideological components of Jost et al.’s (2003)
model of political conservatism. I tested whether General System Justification, Social
Dominance Orientation, and VI could predict political conservatism through Resistance
to Change and Endorsement of inequality, measured by a short modified version of RWA
scale and Economic System Justification respectively. I tested this model in both the
American and Swedish samples to assess whether similar or different patterns emerged.
Results from multiple regression analyses for an American general population
sample (N = 299) indicated that the three ideological predictors explained 56% of the
variance for ESJ (R2 = .56, F(3, 290)=125.22, p < .0001). It was found that GSJ (β = .25,
p < .001), SDO (β = .60, p < .001), and VI (β = .17, p < .0001) all significantly
contributed to the variance and predicted endorsement of inequality (Table 11).

Table 11.
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Endorsement of Inequality
and Resistance to Change (N = 299) – American Sample
Variable
Endorsement of Inequality
Resistance to Change
b

β

SE b

Constant
1.25 .21
Vertical Individualism
.16 .04
.17***
General System
.26 .04
.25***
Justification
Social Dominance
.61 .04
.60***
Orientation
R2
.56
F
125.22***
***p < .0001 (all p values are two-tailed)
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.22
26.16***

β

b

SE b

1.24
.01
.11

.36
.07
.07

.01
.08

.55

.07

.44***

Additionally, I conducted multiple regressions for predicting resistance to change
(RWA). The analysis implied that although 22% of the variance was accounted for (R2
= .22, F(3, 285)=26.16, p < .001), only SDO was significantly predicting resistance to
change (β = .44, p < .001).
Results indicated that the three predictors accounted for 57% of the variance for
the RWA-Resistance scale (R2 = .57, F(3, 143)=61.49, p < .0001) with only GSJ (β = ..78, p < .0001) and VI (β = .14, p < .05) being significant contributors. Results for the
Endorsement of Inequality for the Swedish sample accounted for 49% of the variance (R2
= .49, F(3, 143)=44.84, p < .0001). However, the only variables that significantly
contributed to the variance were VI (β = .22, p < .001) and SDO (β = .59, p < .0001).
Results for the Swedish sample are depicted in Table 12.

Table 12.
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Endorsement of Inequality
and Resistance to Change – Sweden (N = 164)
Variable
Endorsement of Inequality
Resistance to Change
B

SE B

Beta

B

Constant
.99 .46
7.26
Vertical Individualism
.31 .09
.22**
.19
General System Justification
.01 .10
.01
-1.15
Social Dominance Orientation .84 .09
.59***
.02
2
R
.49
.57
F
44.84***
61.49***
***p < .0001, **p < .001, *p < .05 (all p values are two-tailed)
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SE B

Beta

.41
.08
.09
.08

.14*
-.78***
.12

Discussion of Results
The second study was built on the presumption that Vertical Individualism is
systematically associated to the ideological components and outcome variables of
conservatism. This was tested in the first study and reaffirmed in the second study as
significant positive correlations were found between Vertical Individualism (VI) and
General (GSJ) and Economic System Justification (ESJ), Social Dominance Orientation
(SDO), and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) for both the Swedish and American
sample. The only exception was that after revising the RWA scale for the Swedish
sample due to inadequate internal reliability, a new two-item scale was derived (RWAResistance) which did not correlate significantly with Vertical Individualism.
Presuming that Vertical Individualism was associated to conservatism, I tested
whether this relationship held true cross-culturally and if the magnitude of conservative
components were less for an egalitarian oriented individualistic culture. Using
independent t-tests, I found that the Swedish sample scored significantly lower on all
variables when compared to the American one (Table 10). These findings support my
third hypothesis that an egalitarian society, with social-democratic principles dominating
the political arena, tends to be culturally and ideologically less conservative than one
where hierarchical standards are more embraced.
In order to determine the construct validity of Vertical Individualism as it relates
to conservatism, the relationship had to meet two assumptions when cross-culturally
examined. The first one is that if culture is indeed influencing conservatism, or vice
versa, then the magnitude of the cultural dimension as well as conservative components
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should differ accordingly to respective society. This was the case for this study as the
Swedish sample scored less on Vertical Individualism as well as all other conservative
components. Second, if the cultural dimension indeed is suitable for Jost et al.’s (2003)
model of social-cognitive motives of conservatism, then Vertical Individualism should be
significantly associated to conservatism regardless of culture. This was true for all
samples, aside from resistance to change for the University sample in Study 1. These
comparisons provide support for the notion that Vertical Individualism has the potential
of being a suitable addition to the social-cognitive ideological motives for conservatism
as it holds its validity cross-culturally. Nevertheless, this alone is not enough to make a
conclusive claim that Vertical Individualism should be included in the model. More
research, preferably comparing more than only two cultures and how they relate to other
conservative components, is needed until one can make such a final assertion. Moreover,
in order for Vertical Individualism to be included in the ideological components, it also
needs to be able to predict the outcome variables of conservatism, which was tested in the
fourth hypothesis.
Aside from being associated to conservatism, I predicted that Vertical
Individualism also has the potential of predicting the outcome variables of conservatism
in terms of endorsement of inequality (ESJ scale), and resistance to social change (RWA
scale). Multiple regression analysis on a general population sample from both Sweden
and the United States were used to test this. Results indicated that Vertical Individualism
had indeed predictive power with respect to significantly forecasting endorsement of
inequality for both these samples. Although the cultural dimension could predict weakly
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resistance to change for the Swedish sample, it failed to do so for the American sample.
What is also noteworthy is that Vertical Individualism (VI), General System Justification
(GSJ), and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) were able to predict endorsement of
inequality, Economic System Justification (ESJ), significantly with the exception of GSJ
for the Swedish sample; yet these failed to do so consistently predict resistance to change.
Only SDO significantly accounted for the variance in the American sample but not for
the Swedish as GSJ and VI were the only significant ones. These results suggest that
Vertical Individualism, alongside GSJ and SDO, can predict endorsement of inequality
but not resistance to change. The results also indicate that Vertical Individualism is a
suitable addition to Jost et al.’s (2003) model of ideological motives of conservatism with
respect to endorsement of inequality, but not for resistance to change.
General Discussion
Current and Future Research
The findings of this study do not definitively support a direct causal relationship
between culture and conservatism. They do, however, support the notion that political
ideology and culture are related and bound to reflect one another. The findings also
heighten the construct validity of Vertical Individualism and how it is influenced by the
general priorities set through policy by a respective society. Therefore, the question
remains whether culture shapes policies with respect to the acceptance of inequality, or
whether policies influence cultural values. It is important to answer this question in order
to determine the possibility of making a culture less hierarchical by means of legislation.
Although the topic is much too broad to be covered in the current study, it is worth
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discussing within the frameworks of Jost et al.’s (2003) model and the potential role
cultural variables can play in predicting conservative ideology.
Jost et al.’s (2003) model of conservatism proposes that feelings of fear and threat
lead people to develop social-cognitive motives that, through their acceptance of
inequality and resistance to change, result in conservatism. These motives lead people to
believe what they believe in order to satisfy certain psychological functions, such as
minimizing the ambiguity in their world view or helping to ward off concerns and
anxieties about disorder. Most scholars generally agree that the level of conservatism in a
population remains, more or less, the same across time. What does change, however,
depending on circumstances, is its effect (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). This effect is a
function of the perceived threat, which in turn results in measurable consequences for
preferences, behaviors, and opinions (e.g., Feldman & Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005).
Within the framework of authoritarianism, which is closely linked to
conservatism, studies have overwhelmingly shown that legislation and policy-making
tend to change in a conservative direction during times of turmoil and instability, and that
more people embrace these types of changes as the perception of threat increases (Page,
Shapiro, & Dempsey 1987; Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002, Hetherington & Weiler,
2009). Group membership in far right-wing political groups also tends to increase during
threatening times. For instance, far-right political parties, such as the National Front in
France and the Tea Party in the U.S., tend to attract more members and votes during
tumultuous times than during peaceful and quiet ones (Mudde 2007; Hetherington &
Weiler). Of particular interest in these types of circumstances is the way the expressed
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effect of fear increases collective right-wing affiliation. Future research should examine
how support for these types of social movements during threatening times and
circumstances affects culture by increasing right-wing affiliation and widening the
embrace of hierarchical values, as shown by endorsements of inequality and segregation
of social groups.
Psychological threat can manifest in many ways, including the violation of social
norms by group movements or challenging the status quo by military conflicts and
interventions, but perhaps the more prominent and current threat for industrialized
societies is economic destabilization. In fact, studies have shown that during times of
economic hardship, people embrace conservative values and figures more than during
times of economic prosperity (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Economic hardship
naturally also includes a cluster of other types of threats, such as poverty, crime, and the
fear of imminent societal collapse. Scholars have shown that, on an aggregated level,
economic threat leads to support for harsher prison sentences and increased police
budgets (Sales, 1973), enhanced public support for media censorship, and a broader
expression of ethnocentrism and racial prejudice (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991). The
effect of these types of threats seems to be more severe for those scoring high on
authoritarianism and conservatism, who, because they tend to be more reactive and to
perceive threats in their environment to be more imminent, are more likely to adhere to
radical “solutions” (Hetherington & Weiler).
These effects of the perception of social and economic threat provide a
theoretically fitting explanation for why the samples in this study differed. Societies
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where overall wealth is distributed in a more egalitarian manner, such as socialdemocratic ones represented by Sweden in this study, show lower public support for
conservative values because economic threat is perceived to be less imminent. For
instance, the socioeconomic safety-nets, reduction of wealth gaps, and low poverty in the
Scandinavian societies might have dramatically reduced the fear of economic collapse or
hardship. Sweden and its neighboring countries, which are amongst the most secular
societies that are more inclined to assist the poor and encourage social government
programs (e.g., free healthcare and education,) tend to be in many aspects less socially
and politically conservative. These societies tend to show, at face value, a culture
denouncing class-based society and social hierarchy. In this study, for instance, the
Swedish sample scored significantly lower on group based dominance (SDO) and
Vertical Individualism, indicating that tolerance there for a class-based, hierarchical,
society is less than in the US sample. According to the Jost et al.’s (2003) model, this is
due to a reduced perception of threat and a lower fear of potential turmoil.
Additionally, in comparison to the Swedish sample, the American sample scored
significantly higher on General and Economic System Justification, meaning they
perceived the current system and status quo to be more righteous despite its wealth and
social inequalities. It might be noteworthy that currently in the United States, income
inequality has reached its highest point since the 1940s, when national data collection for
economic growth and income began (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). It is also
noteworthy that much research has linked SDO, GSJ, and ESJ directly to conservative
ideologies and right-wing affiliations (Jost et al., 2003; Pratto et al., 1994). Scholars have
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explained this link as being partly due to “justifying” the current system so as to reduce
cognitive ambiguity and anxiety and to give a simpler explanation for the status quo (see
sections on SDO and System Justification.) This is an important point for future research
to explore because it provides insight into how individuals can rationalize inequality, and
what might lead them to accept group segregation during times of economic hardship.
Part of the reason egalitarian societies, such as the Scandinavian ones, are less
vertical and conservative might be their longtime avoidance of armed national military
conflicts and other violent quarrels. These types of conflicts tend to instill an effective
and prolonged fear in a population (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), for it is not only the
armed conflict per se that contributes to existential threats but its byproducts as well, thus
leading to conservative social-cognitive motivations for conservatism. For instance, the
constant reminders that one has a mortal enemy and one’s inclination to rationalize the
situation (epistemic motives,) images of casualties of fellow group-members (existential
motives,) and the threat to one’s traditional societal status quo (ideological motives)
contribute holistically to the inclination to embrace conservative and authoritarian values.
Within the framework of Jost et al.’s (2003) model, because economic and mortal threats
are lower in Sweden than in the US, the Swedes have developed reduced social-cognitive
epistemic and existential cognitive motivations when developing conservative values.
The reduction of these threats might also have led to the subscription to more tolerant
political ideologies and world views, and hence explain why they scored lower on a
hierarchical cultural dimension. Even though these potential theories might neatly align
with theories of conservatism, future research should examine them empirically and be
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attentive to how the avoidance of armed conflict affects culture with respect to receptivity
to authoritarian values.
It is then perhaps fair to make the assertion that policy-making, by controlling for
socioeconomic threat, has some effect on conservatism within a culture. Nevertheless,
social legislation cannot control existential intimidation and fear, stemming, for instance,
from terrorist attacks or military aggression, which has an imminent effect on levels of
authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Hence, in the spirit of a traditional
nature vs. nurture debate, future research should focus on the interaction between
domestic legislation and external threat as it pertains to cultural conservatism. Perhaps
this could result in a better understanding of why military conflicts increase religious
practices, support for autocratic figures, and increases in ethnocentrism (Hetherington &
Weiler). In order to investigate how these factors influence cultural values, future
research should also focus on developing improved instruments for cultural assessments
while being more attentive to cultural tolerance for untraditional values, group-based
dominance, and hierarchical tenets. This would help improve the methodological aspects
of studying and understanding the dynamic between collective and subjective ideology
and situationism.
Implications
Conservatism is not a unidimensional psychological construct, but a cognitive
thought pattern greatly shaped by fear and threat to one’s individual and collective
wellbeing. The level of manifested effect is a function of the perceived imminent threat
in one’s current milieu, resulting in psychological fear and leading to the development of
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social-cognitive motivations that are expressed in a number of ways. Many times the
outcome is dramatic support for legislative action, active participations in civic rightwing movements (a la the Tea-Party,) and increased support for hostile domestic and
foreign policy, such as war or the death penalty (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). No
matter the outcome, the perception of collective fear and threat changes societal values
and hence culture. This is precisely why conservatism, authoritarianism, and right-wing
ideologies are so crucial to understand; when perception of threat reaches high existential
levels, it runs the risk of being manifested in extreme forms, such as religious
fundamentalism, support for autocratic figures (e.g., idolism,) or systematic racism. For
instance, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, support for right-wing legislation
surged resulting in increased public support for military action and defense spending,
President Bush’s approval rating reached its highest point, and anti-Muslim racism
became more prevalent (Hetherington & Weiler).
On an aggregated level, these types of changes in beliefs and attitude reflect how
fear and threat lead to alterations in societal values. Hence, assessing cultural
dimensions after drastic changes in public opinions like these can help us interpret the
dynamic between circumstances and right-wing ideology. This approach also has the
potential for providing a better understanding of why radical ideologies take root and
drastically influence cultures to become less tolerant (e.g., theocratic societies, extremist
organizations, and far-right fascist movements.) Not only is conservatism associated
with low socioeconomic status, but developing societies that have indulged in intense
armed conflict seem to become more autocratic as well (Altemeyer, 1996: Hetherington
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& Weiler, 2009). Even though previous studies have made the assumptions that war and
poverty lead to increased conservative values on an individual level, most have bypassed
the notion that these types of threats result in social values that amplify the group support
for right-wing, radical, ideologies (e.g., Jost et al. 2003). That is, the threats result in
creating a cultural milieu for fostering the acceptance for social and economic inequality
and resistance to change. Culture serves as a reflection of these attitudes, can potentially
act as a mediator for group thinking, and quantifying and assessing it can give insight into
how occurrences influence conservatism on a collective scale, such as the shift in cultural
values after the September 11th terrorist acts.
These are a few of the reasons why culture and conservatism influence one
another and why considering including circumstantial variables is of value to optimize
Jost et al.’s (2003) model of conservatism. Taking cultural values into account can also
lead to two valuable types of directions in research that leads to a better understanding of
how environment and ideology affect each other. First, assessing cultural dimensions and
conservatism allows us to see how societies shift to be more or less tolerant after fear
inducing incidents, including terrorism, fascistic legislation, or military conflict. Second,
it allows us to compare and contrast different cultures. This is particularly valuable as it
not only allows us to see how different societies react to similar threats, but also how
their respective social values might change (one potential approach might be to crossexamine Jost et al.’s (2003) model between diverse societies and using cultural values
acting as mediators.) Although it might not be reasonable to draw conclusions by
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comparing cultures at face value due to their complexity, this methodology has potential
to provide insight into how certain political systems affect cultural values.
Limitations
There are a few caveats to this study that should be taken into account when
considering the results. The first are the small sample sizes used for the University
sample (N = 157), general population samples from the US (N = 299) and Sweden (N =
164), which may be underpowered and not reveal true representative results of the
population. These small sample sizes, together with the fact that Qualtrics services
recruited the participants from their panel with undisclosed locations, might also have
led to a skewed distribution of cultural values. For instance, there is a chance that more
people may have been recruited from a traditionally conservative area (e.g. the American
south,) than a generally more liberal one (e.g., American northwest,) or vice versa
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Future research should focus on larger sample sizes and
be aware of the sub-cultures of right-wing ideologies pertaining to various geographical
regions that can potentially create inaccurate representations of populations.
Another important limitation, and perhaps the most noteworthy one, was the
Swedish short-RWA scale, which reflects reluctance to social change. Although the scale
claimed to have a Cronbach’s alpha of around .72 to .80 across the three samples
(Zakrisson, 2005), reaching satisfactory levels of reliability was problematic. The scale
for the Swedish sample only provided an alpha of .27, which was far below the
acceptance level. Even after conducting multiple factor analyses, the short-RWA still
failed to reach acceptable levels of reliability. In order to use the data obtained from the
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scale to predict resistance to change using multiple regressions, only two items were used
which provided a reliability of .70 for Cronbach’s alpha. This may have confounded the
data and the outcomes for resistance to change in the Swedish sample. Future researchers
should focus on using a scale assessing resistance to change with a good track record for
internal reliability across diverse cultures and languages.
The risk of cultural differences in the interpretation of semantics, constructs, and
concepts is also a potential limitation. Although all instruments, aside from the shortRWA, were translated back and forth multiple times, their conceptual interpretation of
certain terminologies remains a concern. For example, the perception and interpretation
of poverty might be different in an American society than in a Swedish one. Even though
all scales, aside from the short-RWA, had high reliabilities, this issue is still an important
factor to consider when interpreting the results and something to keep in mind for future
directions.
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APPENDIX A
Ethnicity and Education Characteristics for all Samples

Sample

University

U.S

Caucasian

31

252

African American

8

14

Hispanic

38

5

Asian

52

5

Native American

1

2

Pacific Islander

9

Other/Mixed

17

10

Total

157

299

Sweden

Ethnicity

Education
Less than High School

5

15

High School/GED

51

63

79

Some College

79

71

n/a

2-year College

21

43

n/a

4-year College

4

68

24

MA/MS

2

28

14

PhD or MD

6

1

Other Professional Degree

4

31

299

164

Total

157
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APPENDIX B
Short Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale

Rated on a 7 point Likert Scale. Items in italics are reversely scored.
1. Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral
currents prevailing in society today.
2. Our country needs free thinkers, who will have the courage to stand up against
traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.
3. The ‘‘old-fashioned ways’’ and ‘‘old-fashioned values’’ still show the best way to live.
4. Our society would be better off if we showed tolerance and understanding for
untraditional values and opinions.
5. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before
it is too late, violations must be punished.
6. The society needs to show openness towards people thinking differently, rather than a
strong leader, the world is not particularly evil or dangerous.
7. It would be best if newspapers were censored so that people would not be able to get
hold of destructive and disgusting material.
8. Many good people challenge the state, criticize the church and ignore ‘‘the normal
way of living’’.
9. Our forefathers ought to be honored more for the way they have built our society, at
the same time we ought to put an end to those forces destroying it.
10. People ought to put less attention to the Bible and religion, instead they ought to
develop their own moral standards.
11. There are many radical, immoral people trying to ruin things; the society ought to
stop them.
12. It is better to accept bad literature than to censor it.
13. Facts show that we have to be harder against crime and sexual immorality, in order to
uphold law and order.
14. The situation in the society of today would be improved if troublemakers were treated
with reason and humanity.
15. If the society so wants, it is the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil
that poisons our country from within.
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APPENDIX C
Authoritarian-Conservatism-Traditionalism (ACT) Scale

Rated on a 9 point Likert rating scale (see below)
-4: Very strongly disagree
-3: Strongly disagree
-2: Somewhat disagree
-1: Slightly disagree
0: Unsure/Neutral
+1: Slightly agree
+2: Somewhat agree
+3: Strongly agree
+4: Very strongly agree
Authoritarianism (“Authoritarian aggression”)
1. *Strong, tough government will harm not help our country. (R)
2. *Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your
weakness, so it's best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them.
3. *Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws. (R)
4. *The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down
harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order.
5. *Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve
much better care, instead of so much punishment. (R)
6. *The way things are going in this country, it's going to take a lot of "strong medicine"
to straighten out the troublemakers, criminals, and perverts.
7. We should smash all the negative elements that are causing trouble in our society.
8. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be
justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.
9. People who say our laws should be enforced more strictly and harshly are wrong. We
need greater tolerance and more lenient treatment for lawbreakers. (R)
10. The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment would not do any
good in cases like these. (R)
11. What our country really needs is a tough, harsh dose of law and order.
12. Capital punishment is barbaric and never justified. (R)
Conservatism (“Authoritarian submission”)
1. *It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority. (R)
2. *What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in
unity.
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3. *Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize,
and confront established authorities. (R)
4. *Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should
learn.
5. *Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders.
6. *People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws they don’t agree with.
(R)
7. People should be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the overthrow of
the government. (R)
8. The more people there are that are prepared to criticize the authorities, challenge and
protest against the government, the better it is for society. (R)
9. People should stop teaching children to obey authority. (R)
10. The real keys to the "good life" are respect for authority and obedience to those who
are in charge.
11. The authorities should be obeyed because they are in the best position to know what
is good for our country.
12. Our leaders should be obeyed without questions.
Traditionalism
1. *Nobody should stick to the "straight and narrow". Instead people should break loose
and try out lots of different ideas and experiences. (R)
2. *The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.
3. *God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed
before it is too late.
4. *There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. (R)
5. *This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol,
and sex, and pay more attention to family values.
6. *There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. (R)
7. Traditional values, customs, and morality have a lot wrong with them. (R)
8. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences,
even if it makes them different from everyone else. (R)
9. The radical and sinful new ways of living and behaving of many young people may
one day destroy our society.
10. Trashy magazines and radical literature in our communities are poisoning the minds
of our young people. 11. It is important that we preserve our traditional values and moral
standards.
12. People should pay less attention to the bible and the other old-fashioned forms of
religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and
immoral. (R)
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APPENDIX D
Economic System Justification Scale

Indicate level of agreement or disagreement on a scale ranging from 1 to 9.
(R): reversely scored
-4: Very strongly disagree
-3: Strongly disagree
-2: Somewhat disagree
-1: Slightly disagree
0: Unsure/Neutral
+1: Slightly agree
+2: Somewhat agree
+3: Strongly agree
+4: Very strongly agree

1. If people work hard, they almost always get what they want.
2. The existence of widespread economic differences does not mean that they are
inevitable (R).
3. Laws of nature are responsible for differences in wealth in society.
4. There are many reasons to think that the economic system is unfair (R).
5. It is virtually impossible to eliminate poverty.
6. Poor people are not essentially different from rich people (R).
7. Most people who don’t get ahead in our society should not blame the system; they
have only themselves to blame.
8. Equal distribution of resources is a possibility for our society (R).
9. Social class differences reflect differences in natural order of things.
10. Economic differences in the society reflect an illegitimate distribution of
resources (R).
11. There will always be poor people, because there will never be enough jobs for
everybody.
12. Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people’s achievements.
13. If people wanted to change the economic system to make things equal, they could
(R).
14. Equal distribution of resources is unnatural.
15. It is unfair to have an economic system which produces extreme wealth and
extreme poverty at the same time (R).
16. There is no point in trying to make income more equal.
17. There are no inherent differences between rich and poor; it is purely a matter of
circumstance into which you are born (R).
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APPENDIX E
Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Individualism and Collectivism

Scored on a 7 point Likert scale:
1: Strongly disagree
2: Moderately disagree
3: Slightly disagree
4: Neither disagree nor agree
5: Slightly agree
6: Moderately agree
7: Strongly agree

Horizontal Individualism
1. I’d rather depend on myself than others.
2. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.
3. I often do “my own thing.”
4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.
Vertical Individualism
1. It is important that I do my job better than others.
2. Winning is everything.
3. Competition is the law of nature.
4. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.
Horizontal Collectivism
1. If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.
2. The well-being of my coworkers is important to me.
3. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.
4. I feel good when I cooperate with others.
Vertical Collectivism
1. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.
2. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want.
3. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.
4. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.
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APPENDIX F
General System Justification Scale

7 point Likert type response scale:
1: Strongly disagree
2: Moderately disagree
3: Slightly disagree
4: Neither disagree nor agree
5: Slightly agree
6: Moderately agree
7: Strongly agree
Items:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

In general, you find society is fair.
In general, the American political system does operate as intended.
American society is structured adequately.
The United States is the best country in the world to live in.
Most policies do serve the greater good.
Everyone does have a fair shot at wealth and happiness.
Our society does get worse every year.
Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve.
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APPENDIX G
Social Dominance Orientation Scale

Scored on a Likert scale from 1 to 7
7: Extremely positive
6: Somewhat positive
5: Slightly positive
4: Neutral
3: Slightly negative
2: Somewhat negative
1: Extremely negative

Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling
towards?
1. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.*
2. Group equality should be our ideal.*
3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.*
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and others are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. We would have fewer problems if groups were treated more equally.*
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.*
10. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.*
12. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
13. We should strive for increased social equality.*
14. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
15. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
16. No one group should dominate in society.*
* reversely scored
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